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1 Introduction
In two-player, zero-sum games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, it is incumbent
on the players to mix according to minimax. In particular, the mixing cannot be predictable,
otherwise a player could devise a strategy to exploit an opponent who does not properly
randomize.
Research has shown that people have di¢ culty detecting and producing random sequences
of the sort required for the execution of minimax.1 Further, laboratory evidence suggests
that mixing often does not occur as predicted, particularly when the data is analyzed at the
individual level.2 However, it is possible that subjects lack su¢ cient incentives or experience.
Rather than study this question in the laboratory, we go to the eld, literally, examining
strategic decisions in the National Football League (NFL). We categorize each o¤ensive play
as either a "rush" or a "pass" and investigate whether the chosen sequence exhibits serial
correlation. While we acknowledge that the laboratory has certain advantages over the eld,
it is also the case that our setting exhibits advantages over the laboratory. NFL coaches and
players earn large salaries and are under intense pressure to win, as evidenced by their frequent
employment terminations. They can also confer with other highly trained and incentivized
professionals,3 and make detailed plans prior to the game.
We nd that, despite these incentives, expertise, and opportunities for consultation and
planning, observed play calling exhibits signicant negative serial correlation. We also nd
that, according to two measures, play e¢ cacy is adversely a¤ected by excessive switching
between play types. Our results suggest that teams could benet from more clustered play
sequences, which switch play type less frequently.
1For instance, see Wagenaar (1972), Bar-Hillel, and Wagenaar (1991), Rabin (2002), and Oskarsson et al.
(2009). Note that research nds that there are di¤erences between the generation of such sequences in decision
problems and strategic settings (Rapoport and Budescu, 1992; Budescu and Rapoport, 1994).
2Since ONeill (1987) and the reexamination of the original data by Brown and Rosenthal (1990) there
has been mixed evidence regarding mixed strategies in the laboratory. This literature includes Batzilis et al.
(2014), Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Proulx (2001), Du¤y, Owens, and Smith (2015), Geng et al. (2015), Levitt,
List, and Reiley (2010), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994, 1997), ONeill (1991), Ochs (1995), Palacios-Huerta
and Volij (2008), Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000, 2004), Rapoport and Boebel (1992), Rosenthal, Shachat, and
Walker (2003), Shachat (2002), Van Essen and Wooders (2015).
3Okano (2013) nds that behavior in a repeated game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium is closer
to the minimax prediction when teams of two play rather than when individuals play.
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While the existing literature can explain the negative serial correlation, it does not explain
the reduced e¢ cacy of plays associated with the negative serial correlation. Our results are
consistent with defenses expecting the negative serial correlation exhibited by the o¤enses.
This seems to be the case as clustered plays are more e¤ective. Why would o¤enses employ
an exploitable strategy that exhibits negative serial correlation? It is possible that they
excessively switch in order to appear "unpredictable" to people (fans, owners, etc.) who have
trouble detecting statistically independent sequences. It could also be the case that this e¤ect is
larger than the negative consequences that arise from the negative serial correlation. Therefore,
our analysis is consistent with the view that teams want to be viewed as unpredictable by
people who have di¢ culty detecting an independent sequence, and that the teams accept the
reduced e¢ cacy of their plays resulting from the negative serial correlation.
1.1 Background details of football
American football (hereafter referred to as football) is contested on a 100 yard4 long rectangular
eld. Two competing teams attempt to advance a ball towards the others end zone, located
at opposite ends of the eld. Teams receive six points from a touchdown, by advancing the
ball into their opponents end zone, and three points from a eld goal, by kicking the ball
through a set of elevated goal posts over their opponents end zone.5
The action is broken into discrete units called plays. The o¤ensive team increases its
chance of scoring points, and therefore winning the game, by advancing the ball towards the
defensive teams end zone. The distance to the defensive teams end zone is referred to as eld
position.
When a team has possession of the ball, it has four plays, called rst down through fourth
down, in order to advance the ball a minimum of ten yards. These plays are referred to as
plays from scrimmage. If the team succeeds in advancing ten yards, an achievement also
referred to as a rst down, the o¤ensive team gets a new set of four downs to advance the
ball another ten yards. If the o¤ensive team fails to net ten yards in the set of four plays,
4One yard is the equivalent of 0.9144 meters.
5A eld goal is more likely to succeed when it is attempted closer to the opponents end zone.
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possession is transferred to the other team.6 The number of yards that the o¤ensive team
needs to advance in order to achieve a rst down is called the distance. The sequence of plays
where only one team possesses the ball is referred to as a possession.
From an analytic perspective, an attractive aspect of football is that the beginning of each
play can be well-characterized by the score, down, distance, and eld position. On each play,
teams benet from accurately predicting the strategy of their opponent,7 and by maintaining
unpredictability in their own strategies. The space of available actions for both teams on each
play is large and di¢ cult to characterize. Fortunately, the strategy of the o¤ensive team on
each play can be meaningfully separated into one of two distinct categories: a pass or a rush.8
We explore whether the pass-rush mix exhibits serial correlation.9
Rule violations are referred to as penalties, which can be categorized as either a dead ball
penalty, where the play is not allowed to continue and must be repeated, or a live ball penalty,
where the play is allowed to continue to completion.10 For our purposes, the distinction is
important because we can observe the type of play called on a live ball penalty, but not on a
dead ball penalty.
The game is divided into four quarters of 15 minutes. Play is stopped at the end of the
second quarter and in the third quarter the game is restarted under di¤erent conditions than
those at the end of the second quarter. The game ends at the end of the fourth quarter.
Therefore, we refer to the end of the second and fourth quarters as the end of play.
6The o¤ensive team has the option to "punt," or kick the ball down the eld, surrendering the ball to the
other team. Teams often employ the punt on fourth down thereby rendering third down e¤ectively the nal
opportunity to complete the ten yards. See Romer (2006) for more on the decision to punt on fourth down.
7Teams go to great lengths to obscure their strategies, and at times bend the rules to decipher those of
their opponents. In 2007, the New England Patriots incurred one of the steepest punishments in NFL history
for videotaping opposing coaches in order to learn their strategies.
8A pass is a play in which one player, normally the quarterback, attempts to advance the ball by throwing
it forward to another player. A rush is a play in which a player attempts to advance the ball by carrying it.
9We acknowledge that, while the coaches are one source of the called play, it is also the case that many
teams allow the o¤ensive players to change the play after viewing the alignment of the defense. For instance,
see Bundrick and McGarrity (2014). Our data set does not allow us to distinguish between these possibilities.
Therefore, we simply regard the decision making unit as the team.
10For live ball penalties, the o¤ended team generally has the option to either accept the penalty and replay
the down, or to decline the penalty and accept the result of the play. Below, we refer to accepted live ball
penalties as simply live ball penalties.
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1.2 Related Literature
Laboratory studies nd mixed evidence as to whether subjects play mixed strategies according
to minimax. However, laboratory subjects may face relatively small material incentives and
lack the necessary experience. In response to this critique, a growing literature examines
mixed strategies in professional sports. These settings are characterized by large incentives
and participants with a great deal of experience.11
Walker and Wooders (2001) examine the direction of serves in professional tennis matches.
They nd that the probability of success for serves to the right and serves to the left are
not di¤erent, which is consistent with the equilibrium predictions. However, the authors note
that the serves exhibit negative serial correlation, whereby the direction of a serve is not
independent of the direction of the previous serve. Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007) perform a
similar analysis on a di¤erent tennis data set. In contrast to Walker and Wooders (2001), the
authors do not nd evidence of serial correlation of serves.
Other papers examine the direction of penalty kicks in soccer. They largely nd that
participants mix according to equilibrium predictions (Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose, 2002;
Palacios-Huerta, 2003; Coloma, 2007; Azar and Bar-Eli, 2011; Buzzacchi and Pedrini, 2014).
In contrast, Bar-Eli et al. (2007) examine the behavior of soccer goalkeepers in penalty kicks,
where the action choice is either to dive to the left, dive to the right, or stay in the middle
of the goal. The authors nd that the frequency with which goalkeepers stay in the middle
is excessively small. The authors interpret this as an Action Bias, whereby the goalkeepers
have a preference to be perceived as doing something to attempt to keep the goal from being
scored, despite that this is suboptimal for the purposes of preventing the goal.12
To our knowledge, there are two previous studies that investigate serial correlation in
the pass-rush mix in football, Kovash and Levitt (2009) and McGarrity and Linnen (2010).
11Goldman and Rao (2013) nd that professional basketball players are largely successful at solving the
complex optimization problem regarding the decision to shoot or wait for a better shot before the time in which
the team is required to shoot.
12Another line of research investigates whether the ability to mix according to the equilibrium predictions in
a familiar strategic setting in the eld translates to the ability to mix properly in an unfamiliar strategic setting
in the laboratory. The conclusions in this literature are not uncontroversial (see Levitt, List, and Reiley, 2010;
Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2008; Van Essen and Wooders, 2015; Wooders, 2010).
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McGarrity and Linnen (2010) examine play calling while restricting attention to rst downs
with a distance of ten yards. The authors analyze 11 NFL teams in the 2006 season and
perform a test of runs for serial independence. They reject serial independence for only one
of the 11 teams: their analysis supports the claim that play calling largely does not exhibit
serial correlation. By contrast, analysis of our more extensive data nds serial correlation in
play calling and that it leads to plays with reduced e¢ cacy.
As we do, Kovash and Levitt (2009) nd negative serial correlation across plays. Our study
di¤ers in that we employ di¤erent measures of e¢ cacy. The authors estimate the expected
number of points, given any prole of down, distance, and eld position. Their measure
of e¢ cacy entails calculating the di¤erence in the expected points before and after every
play. By contrast, our measures are more standard (yards gained and whether the play was
successful according to a standard measure) and we explicitly control for the prole of down,
distance, and eld position in our econometric specication. We favor the measures that we
use over the expected points measure because the true value of the latter will vary by team,
by year, and even by the available personnel. There are additional di¤erences, as Kovash and
Levitt compare the e¢ cacy of a rush and a pass, and conclude that the play calling violates
the equilibrium predictions. Our investigation does not compare the di¤erences in outcomes
between a pass and a rush, but explores whether play e¢ cacy is a¤ected by previous outcomes.
2 Data
Data, obtained from http://armchairanalysis.com for a small fee, includes an observation for
each play from each regular season and playo¤ game from the 2000 season through the 2012
season. The data set contains 562; 564 plays from 3455 games. As is standard in the literature
on football data,13 we exclude data near the end of play and those characterized by a large
score di¤erential. Therefore, we omit from our analysis plays that occurred in the last 2
minutes of the second quarter, plays that occurred in the fourth quarter,14 and plays that
13For instance, see Romer (2006) and Kovash and Levitt (2009).
14 If the game is tied at the end of the fourth quarter, the teams go on to play an additional period referred
to as overtime. We also exclude plays that occurred in overtime.
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occurred when the absolute value of the point di¤erence was 22 points or greater. After also
excluding plays not from scrimmage (kicko¤s, punts, eld goal attempts, extra points, and
two-point conversions), we have 257; 782 plays from scrimmage and 267; 584 o¤ensive play
decisions.
From a brief description of the play, we categorize each play as either a rush or a pass.
Most of our categorizations should not be controversial and are identical to that provided
by the data set. We do, however, categorize a "lateral pass" as a pass, whereas the o¢ cial
records categorize this as a rush. Further, we categorize any play in which an illegal forward
pass penalty is called as a pass and not a rush. Finally, we categorize quarterback sacks as a
pass, since the play is a failed pass play.
In addition to the down, distance, and eld position of each play, our data includes the
home team, the current score, the betting point spread, and whether there was a penalty on
the play. Further, our data includes the conditions of the game: a characterization of the
weather and wind conditions, and whether the game was played on grass or articial turf.
We also include two di¤erent measures of the e¢ cacy of a play. The rst measure we use
is the number of yards gained by the play. The second measure, which was included in the
original data set, is whether the play is successful if on 1st down 40% of the distance is gained,
on 2nd down 60% of the distance is gained, and on 3rd and 4th downs 100% of the distance
is gained. Finally, we dene a play as a failure if one yard or less is gained.
As this paper explores serial correlation in play calling, the assignment of a previous play
to each play is crucial to the analysis. Plays that begin a possession are not assigned a previous
play. Many complications in the assignment of a previous play arise due to the occurrence of
penalties. Dead ball penalties are excluded from our analysis as the play type is not observed.
The play following any sequence of dead ball penalties is assigned a previous play identical to
the play type of the play preceding the sequence. A total of 209; 963 plays from scrimmage
are assigned a previous play. We explore alternate methods of identifying a plays previous
play, which we include in the supplemental online Appendix A. Our conclusions are robust to
these alternate specications.
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3 Results
3.1 Summary statistics
In the analysis below, our independent variables include the down, the distance, the eld
position,15 the point di¤erence,16 and the di¤erence between the point di¤erence and the
betting point spread. In order to account for the particular matchup between the teams, we
include the fraction of plays that were passes by the o¤ense within the particular game, the
yards per pass earned within the game, the yards per rush earned within the game, and the
fraction of plays within the game that were considered a success. We o¤er a summary of
several key independent variables in Table 1.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Down 1:786 0:800 1 4
Distance 8:584 3:833 1 48
Fraction of pass plays in game 0:562 0:112 0:123 0:891
Fraction of successful plays in game 0:447 0:082 0:0952 0:773
Yards earned per pass in game 6:140 1:951  0:500 19:818
Yards earned per rush in game 4:046 1:270  2:375 13:562
Point di¤erence  0:790 7:786  21 21
Play was a failure 0:380 0:485 0 1
We list the summary statistics for several key independent variables. The
mean and standard deviation calculations are performed on the play-level rather
than the game-level. The data includes 257; 782 observations. We note that these
calculations include plays that do not have a previous play.
Table 2 summarizes two measures of play e¢ cacy: yards gained by the play and whether
the play was successful.
15We treat this as a categorical variable indicating whether the play originated 81 or more yards from their
goal, between 51 and 80 yards, between 50 and 21 yards, between 20 and 6, or 5 yards or less.
16We calculate this by subtracting the score of the defense from the score of the o¤ense.
8
Table 2 Comparison between pass and rush
Yards Successful
Mean SD Mean SD
Pass 6:212 10:158 0:443 0:497
Rush 4:264 6:357 0:458 0:498
z-statistic  7:57 8:09
p-value < 0:001 < 0:001
We provide the mean and standard deviation of both the yards gained and
whether the play was a success, by play type. We also report the results of Mann-
Whitney tests of the di¤erence between rush and pass plays. The data includes
257; 782 observations, involving 139; 302 pass plays and 118; 480 rush plays. Note
that these calculations include plays which do not have a previous play.
We note that pass plays, on average, gain more yards than rush plays, though rush plays
more often satisfy our denition of a successful play.17 These two di¤erences are signicant
according to Mann-Whitney tests. We also note that, while pass plays have a signicantly
larger mean of yards gained, they also have a larger standard deviation of yards gained as
measured by an F-test of the equality of variances (F (139301; 118479) = 2:55, p < 0:001).
3.2 Serial correlation
We now explore the rst of our primary research questions, whether the pass-rush mix exhibits
serial correlation. Our dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the play is a pass and a 0
otherwise. We employ logistic regressions to determine which factor inuences this outcome.
Independent variables include the down, the distance, the eld position, the point di¤erence,
the di¤erence between the point di¤erence and the betting point spread, the fraction of plays
that were passes by the o¤ense within the particular game, the yards per pass earned within
the game, the yards per rush earned within the game, and the fraction of plays within the
game that were considered a success. We also control for various observables, such as whether
the game was played in excessively cold conditions,18 excessively windy conditions,19 wet
17For more on the optimality of the pass-rush mix, see Alamar (2006, 2010), Reed, Critcheld, and Martens
(2006), Rockerbie (2008), Kovash and Levitt (2009), and Stilling and Critcheld (2010).
18We have two categories: if the temperature is less than 20 Fahrenheit (-6.67 Celsius) or if it is greater than
20 degrees Fahrenheit but less than 30 Fahrenheit (-1.1 Celsius).
19We have two categories: if the wind speed is higher than 30 miles per hour (mph) or if it is less than 30
mph but higher than 20 mph.
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conditions,20 whether the game was played on grass,21 and whether the o¤ense was also the
home team. Finally, we include specications that account for the team-season xed-e¤ects.22
We summarize this analysis in Table 3.
Table 3 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Previous pass  0:529  0:546  0:410  0:425
(0:0101) (0:0101) (0:0123) (0:0123)
Previous failure     0:210 0:210
(0:0177) (0:0178)
Previous pass * Previous failure      0:395  0:399
(0:0219) (0:0220)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Y es No Y es
 2 Log L 252380:07 251468:39 252048:58 251132:76
LR 2 35673:79 36585:47 36005:28 36921:10
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Each regression
has 209; 963 observations. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
First, the previous pass variable is negative and signicant in each specication. This
provides evidence that, even after controlling for down, distance, eld position, and other
observables, play calling exhibits signicant negative serial correlation.23 The Previous pass-
Previous failure interaction estimate is negative and signicant in both of the specications
where it appears, suggesting that play calling becomes even more negatively serially correlated
following a failed play.24
20We note whether the description of the game included a mention of snow, rain, or urries.
21See Bailey and McGarrity (2012) for an example of an analysis that also considers the playing surface.
Unlike these authors, we do not nd a signicant e¤ect.
22 In our sample, there are 414 team-seasons. In the rst two years of our sample there were 31 teams, as
the Houston Texans did not yet exist. For the remaining years, there were 32 teams in the league.
23We run the regression (1) in Table 3, restricted to each of the 414 team-seasons. We nd that the 2003
San Francisco 49ers have the smallest Previous pass estimate of  1:77 and the 2004 Saint Louis Rams have the
largest at 0:37. See the supplemental online Appendix D for a discussion of the team-specic details and the
exploration of the distribution of serial correlation across teams.
24We conduct the analysis similar to regression (4) in Table 3, on all four specications of the previous play.
Table A3 summarizes this analysis. We note that the specication of the previous play does not a¤ect the
results.
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3.3 Serial correlation and yards gained
We now explore how serially correlated play calling a¤ects play e¢ cacy. As we do not observe
the strategy of the defensive team, we examine whether the observed negative serial correlation
is a best response to the unobserved strategy of the defense. We begin by analyzing the e¤ect
of serial correlation on yards gained. As independent variables, we include dummy variables
indicating whether the play is a pass, whether the previous play was a failure, and whether
the play type is the same type (rush or pass) as the previous play. We include team-seasons
xed-e¤ects and the same control variables that were used in the analysis summarized in Table
3. Results of this regression are summarized in the (Prev 1) specication in Table B1 in the
online appendix. We use the coe¢ cients from this regression to estimate the di¤erences in
yards gained for both rushes and passes based on observable histories. We perform a Wald
Test in order to test whether these di¤erences are signicant. This analysis is summarized in
Table 4.
Table 4 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained between a...
Rush following a rush and a rush following a pass 0:138
(0:0674)
Pass following a pass and a pass following a rush 0:211
(0:0511)
Rush following a failed rush and a rush following a failed pass 0:238
(0:118)
Rush following a non-failed rush and a rush following a non-failed pass 0:0368
(0:0646)
Pass following a failed pass and a pass following a failed rush 0:0834
(0:0776)
Pass following a non-failed pass and a pass following a non-failed rush 0:338
(0:0660)
R2 0:05
F-value 24:89
These estimates are based on 209; 963 observations. These comparisons are
based on the analysis summarized in Table B1. Based on the Wald test of the
estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01,
and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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First we note that there are no negative estimates in Table 4, suggesting that running the
same play type as the previous play does not present a disadvantage in terms of yards gained.
The rst two rows only control for the play type and not whether the previous play was a
failure. We nd that a rush following a rush gains 0:14 more yards than a rush following a
pass. We also nd that a pass following a pass gains 0:21 more yards than a pass following a
rush. Estimates are more pronounced when we also control for whether the previous play was
a failure. We nd that a rush gains 0:24 more yards more following a failed rush than following
a failed pass. Also, a pass gains 0:34 more yards following a non-failed pass than following
a non-failed rush. In summary, we nd evidence that the e¢ cacy of a play, as measured by
yards gained, increases if it follows a play of the same type.25
3.4 Serial correlation and success
We nd that negative serial correlation adversely a¤ects the yards gained by a play. In this
subsection, we employ an alternate measure of e¢ cacy, the binary measure of success. This
measure is di¤erent than yards gained, as passes obtain a larger average yards gained but
rushes are more likely to be considered a success. We estimate di¤erences, similar to that
summarized in Table 4, but with this binary measure. We run the logistic regression that
is summarized in the (Prev 1) specication in Table B2 in the online appendix. Given this
analysis, we estimate the di¤erences that we are interested in and conduct Wald tests on these
estimates. We summarize these estimates in Table 5.
25 In Table A4, we perform the analogous analysis on all four specications of previous and nd that the
results are unchanged.
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Table 5 Di¤erence in success estimates between a...
Rush following a rush and a rush following a pass 0:123
(0:0176)
Pass following a pass and a pass following a rush 0:0274
(0:0131)
Rush following a failed rush and a rush following a failed pass 0:251
(0:0313)
Rush following a non-failed rush and a rush following a non-failed pass  0:0055
(0:0160)
Pass following a failed pass and a pass following a failed rush 0:0110
(0:0202)
Pass following a non-failed pass and a pass following a non-failed rush 0:0437
(0:0165)
 2 Log L 269807:43
These estimates are based on 209; 963 observations. These comparisons are
based on the analysis summarized in Table B2. Based on the Wald test of the
estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01,
and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
There are no signicant and negative estimates in Table 5, again suggesting that plays
are more successful when they follow plays of the same type. In addition, our results again
become more pronounced when we condition on the possibility that the previous play was a
failure. We nd that a rush play is signicantly more likely to be successful when following a
failed rush play than when following a failed pass play. We also nd that a pass play following
a non-failed pass play is signicantly more likely to be successful than a pass play following a
non-failed rush play.26 The analysis summarized in Table 5 reinforces that of Table 4, and
provides evidence that play e¢ cacy is a¤ected by previous actions and previous outcomes.
3.5 Analysis of second down
In the analysis above, we examined plays that occurred on each of the four downs. However,
it is possible that behavior di¤ers su¢ ciently across downs, so we analyze second and third
downs separately. We begin by restricting our attention to second down and conduct an
analysis identical to that summarized in Table 3. We summarize this analysis in Table 6.
26We also conduct the estimates as summarized in Table 5 but with an alternate measure of success. This
can be found in Table C1, in the online appendix.
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Table 6 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass on second down
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Previous pass  0:953  0:973  0:639  0:655
(0:0157) (0:0159) (0:0226) (0:0228)
Previous failure     0:203 0:204
(0:0231) (0:0233)
Previous pass * Previous failure      0:622  0:629
(0:0319) (0:0322)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Y es No Y es
 2 Log L 109300:05 108263:19 108919:52 107882:13
LR 2 10665:72 11702:59 11046:26 12083:64
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Each regression
has 86; 645 observations. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
We again nd evidence of negative serial correlation. We also nd that a second consecutive
pass on second down is even less likely after a failed pass on rst down.
Next we investigate whether the negative serial correlation on second down a¤ects the
e¢ cacy of plays. We conduct an analysis similar to that summarized in Table 4, restricting
attention to second down. This analysis is summarized in Table B3 in the online appendix.
From this analysis we estimate the di¤erences, which are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained on second down between a...
Rush following a rush and a rush following a pass 0:239
(0:0857)
Pass following a pass and a pass following a rush 0:452
(0:0851)
Rush following a failed rush and a rush following a failed pass 0:389
(0:1328)
Rush following a non-failed rush and a rush following a non-failed pass 0:0886
(0:107)
Pass following a failed pass and a pass following a failed rush 0:315
(0:108)
Pass following a non-failed pass and a pass following a non-failed rush 0:589
(0:131)
R2 0:05
F-value 10:38
These estimates are based on 86; 645 observations. These comparisons are
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based on the analysis summarized in Table B3. Based on the Wald test of the
estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01,
and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
We again nd no signicant and negative estimate of the di¤erence in yards gained on
second down. In fact, the di¤erences on second down appear more pronounced. While Table
4 only has 2 of the 6 conditions that are signicant at 0:01, Table 7 has 5 of the 6. As in the
previous analyses, the adverse impact of switching play type becomes more pronounced when
the previous play was a failure.27 In summary, we nd evidence of serial correlation of plays
called on second down and that second down plays are more successful following plays of the
same type.
3.6 Analysis of third down
Table 8 shows the results of the analysis conducted in the same manner as that summarized
in Table 6, with attention restricted to third down.
Table 8 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass on third down
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Previous pass  0:0293  0:0281  0:0603  0:0593
(0:0227) (0:0231) (0:0302) (0:0307)
Previous failure     0:139 0:144
(0:0320) (0:0324)
Previous pass * Previous failure     0:0314 0:0306
(0:0460) (0:0467)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Y es No Y es
 2 Log L 50970:84 50245:27 50931:61 50204:85
LR 2 5882:85 6608:41 5922:07 6648:84
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Each regression
has 54; 922 observations. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Evidence of negative serial correlation on third down plays is weaker and the estimates are
signicant only at the 0:1 level. In the specications that do not include Previous failure, we
27We also conduct the analogous analysis consisting of the success measure, rather than the yards gained
measure, on second down plays. This is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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do not nd evidence of serial correlation, and the Previous pass-Previous failure interaction is
not signicant in either of our specications.
Table 9 shows the results of our analysis, similar to that in the previous subsection, re-
stricting attention to third down plays. The analysis is summarized in Table B4, in the online
appendix. From this analysis we estimate the relevant di¤erences, which are presented in
Table 9.
Table 9 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained on third down between a...
Rush following a rush and a rush following a pass  0:101
(0:180)
Pass following a pass and a pass following a rush 0:0331
(0:0940)
Rush following a failed rush and a rush following a failed pass  0:324
(0:279)
Rush following a non-failed rush and a rush following a non-failed pass 0:122
(0:227)
Pass following a failed pass and a pass following a failed rush  0:141
(0:124)
Pass following a non-failed pass and a pass following a non-failed rush 0:207
(0:140)
R2 0:05
F-value 7:17
These estimates are based on 54; 922 observations. These comparisons are
based on the analysis summarized in Table B4. Based on the Wald test of the
estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01,
and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Table 9 does not contain a single signicant relationship, suggesting that the weaker evi-
dence of negative serial correlation found in Table 8 does not a¤ect the e¢ cacy of third down
plays. We also note that the analogous analysis consisting of the success of the play, rather
than the yards gained, is qualitatively similar to that of Table 9.28
28The one exception is that there is a positive di¤erence in the estimate of the probability of success of a
rush following a failed rush and the probability of success of a rush following a failed pass, which is signicant
at 0:1 in all four specications. This is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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4 Conclusion
We use play-level data to analyze play calling in 3455 National Football League games from
the 2000 season through the 2012 season. We categorize every relevant play as either a pass
or a rush, and nd that the play calling exhibits negative serial correlation. In other words,
play type switches more than an independent stochastic process.
We also nd that play e¢ cacy is a¤ected by previous actions and previous outcomes. In
particular, we nd that rush plays following rush plays earn more yards and are more likely to
be successful than rush plays following pass plays. We nd the analogous result for pass plays.
Given that the yards and success measures exhibit di¤erent properties, it should be all the
more surprising that their qualitative implications regarding the e¤ects of serial correlation
are similar. Further, we nd that the adverse impact of excessive switching between play types
becomes more pronounced when the previous play was a failure. We also conduct an analysis
of serial correlation separately for second and third downs. Second down plays exhibit stronger
negative serial correlation and the adverse e¤ects of serial correlation are more pronounced
than on third down.
What are we to make of our results? How could it be the case that experienced, incen-
tivized decision makers who can consult other professionals, and can make detailed plans, mix
in a manner that is exploitable?
A possible explanation for our ndings of serial correlation is that the play calling switches
too often because of the fatigue of the players involved in the play. This may explain the
negative serial correlation of plays but it does not explain the results regarding the e¢ cacy of
plays. In particular, we nd that there is a positive benet when two consecutive plays are
of the same type rather than when the two consecutive plays are di¤erent types. Therefore,
the material e¤ects of fatigue cannot explain our results. It is possible that di¤erences in
the perception of fatigue by the o¤ense and defense could explain our results. However, it is
di¢ cult for us to see how these di¤erences in the perception of fatigue could be su¢ ciently
and systematically di¤erent to explain our results.
Another possible explanation follows from the research that indicates that people have dif-
17
culty producing independent, random sequences.29 Whereas this could explain the negative
serial correlation of play calling, it cannot explain the reduced e¢ cacy of plays associated with
the serial correlation. The latter is consistent with the claim that the defense expects the play
calling of the o¤ense to excessively switch play type.
It is possible that there are excessive computational di¢ culties in mixing randomly. The
teams must not simply decide to rush or to pass but rather which of the several hundred
pass or rush plays to execute. Perhaps the e¤ects of these computational di¢ culties could
explain our results.30 While this can explain the negative serial correlation of play calling, it
is not clear why the lower e¢ cacy associated with the negative serial correlation would be so
persistent.
Perhaps teams feel pressure not to repeat the play type on o¤ense, in order to avoid
criticism for being too "predictable" by fans, media, or executives who have di¢ culty detecting
whether outcomes of a sequence are statistically independent. Further, perhaps this concern
is su¢ ciently important so that teams accept the negative consequences that arise from the
risk that the defense can detect a pattern in their mixing.31 This explanation is reminiscent
of the Action bias found by Bar-Eli et al. (2007). The explanation that teams do not want
to be viewed as predictable and accept the reduction in the e¢ cacy of their plays that result
from the negative serial correlation seems to be the explanation most consistent with our data.
We stop short of claiming that the teams are not acting according to the minimax predic-
tions. While we use two reasonable measures of e¢ cacy, the ultimate objective of the teams
is to win the game. Although success on any given play is related to winning the game, it
is not obvious that an equilibrium within each particular play is identical to the equilibrium
in the extensive form of the game. For instance, Walker, Wooders, and Amir (2011) study
a setting in which two agents engage in a sequence of plays, each with one of two possible
outcomes. This continues until a winner of the overall game is declared. The authors show
the conditions under which the equilibrium within any particular play is also the equilibrium
of the larger overall game. As our game is more complicated than theirs, it is not obvious
29See Wagenaar (1972), Bar-Hillel, and Wagenaar (1991), Rabin (2002), and Oskarsson et al. (2009).
30For instance, see Halpern and Pass (2015).
31See Shachat and Swarthout (2004) and Spiliopoulos (2012).
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that this result holds in our setting. Further, providing such an argument is beyond the scope
of this paper. On the other hand, we suspect that a formal argument will show that, given
reasonable restrictions on the preferences of the teams and the setting, the exhibition of serial
correlation would not be consistent with the minimax of the overall game. We leave this issue
for future work.
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Supplemental Online Appendix
In Appendix A, we explore the robustness of our specication of the previous play. In Appendix
B, we present the regressions that formed the basis of the estimates in Tables 4, 5, 7, and
9. In Appendix C, we employ an alternate specication of the success of the play. Finally
in Appendix D, we include an exploration of the distribution of the serial correlation across
teams.
Appendix A: Di¤erent specications of the previous play
In the body of the paper we describe and analyze a particular specication of the previous
play. In this appendix, we refer to this as Previous 1. In order to learn whether our results are
robust to di¤erent ways of assigning a previous play, we describe and analyze three alternate
specications. One alternate specication is to assign the previous play as in Previous 1, except
that plays following dead ball penalties are not assigned previous plays. Unlike Previous 1,
here the teams do not consider the information prior to a dead ball penalty. We refer to this
specication as Previous 2. There are 203; 791 plays from scrimmage with an observation
involving Previous 2.
Another way to assign the previous play is done as Previous 1, except that information
observed in plays with a live ball penalty is not used. In other words, the play following
any sequence of penalties is assigned a previous play identical to the play type of the play
preceding the sequence. We refer to this specication as Previous 3. There are 202; 329 plays
from scrimmage with an observation involving Previous 3.
Finally, one could assign the previous play as in Previous 3, except that plays following
live ball or dead ball penalties are not assigned previous plays. In other words, here the teams
do not consider the information prior to any penalty. We refer to this variable as Previous 4.
There are 194; 860 plays from scrimmage with an observation involving Previous 4.
We summarize the di¤erences among these four techniques in Table A1, where a check
indicates that it satises the criteria.
Table A1 Summary of the di¤erences among previous play classications
Previous 1 Previous 2 Previous 3 Previous 4
1. Include live ball penalties X X
2. Include plays following live X X X
ball penalties
Following a live ball penalty:
2a. previous play is the most X X
recent live ball penalty
2b. previous play is the most X
recent non-penalized play
3. Include plays following dead X X
ball penalties
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To illustrate the di¤erences among the previous classications, consider the following ex-
ample. The rst play of the possession is a pass. The second is a rush. The third is a live
ball penalty on a pass play. The fourth is a rush. The fth is a dead ball penalty. The
sixth and seventh plays are passes. Table A2 illustrates the di¤erences among the previous
classications in this example.
Table A2 An example sequence of plays and the corresponding previous classications
Play Play Type Previous 1 Previous 2 Previous 3 Previous 4
1 Pass        
2 Rush Pass Pass Pass Pass
3 Pass-Live ball penalty Rush Rush    
4 Rush Pass Pass Rush  
5 No play-Dead ball penalty        
6 Pass Rush   Rush  
7 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
Note that the di¤erence between Previous 1 and 3 lies in whether information about the
play call for a live ball penalty is considered. The di¤erence between Previous 1 and 2 lies
in whether information prior to a dead ball penalty is considered. The di¤erence between
Previous 3 and 4 lies in whether information prior to any penalty is considered. Finally, note
that in the fourth play of the possession, Previous 1 and 2 have a di¤erent assignment than
Previous 3. This is because Previous 1 and 2 consider information that the previous play,
which was given a live ball penalty, was a pass play. In contrast, Previous 3 disregards the
information of the play call in the live ball penalty but considers information learned prior to
the play call in the live ball penalty. Therefore, Previous 3 categorizes the previous play as a
rush and not a pass.
Table A3 reproduces the analysis in regression (4) of Table 3 for all four specications of
the previous play. Note that the (Prev 1) regression in Table A3, is identical to regression (4)
in Table 3.
Table A3 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Previous pass  0:425  0:423  0:410  0:420
(0:0123) (0:0125) (0:0125) (0:0128)
Previous failure 0:210 0:196 0:179 0:127
(0:0178) (0:0182) (0:0179) (0:0188)
Previous pass * Previous failure  0:399  0:426  0:446  0:479
(0:0220) (0:0224) (0:0224) (0:0230)
 2 Log L 251132:76 243932:73 241843:88 232353:73
LR 2 36921:10 35952:74 35954:28 35188:28
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
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indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Table A4 reproduces the estimates of Table 4 for all four specications of the previous
play. Note that the (Prev 1) estimates Table A4 are identical to estimates in Table 4.
Table A4 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained between a...
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Rush following a rush and 0:138 0:134 0:129 0:148
a rush following a pass (0:0674) (0:0683) (0:0679) (0:0698)
Pass following a pass and 0:211 0:234 0:206 0:236
a pass following a rush (0:0511) (0:0520) (0:0522) (0:0532)
Rush following a failed rush and 0:238 0:227 0:211 0:249
a rush following a failed pass (0:118) (0:120) (0:119) (0:123)
Rush following a non-failed rush and 0:0368 0:0413 0:0469 0:0472
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:0646) (0:0651) (0:0654) (0:0666)
Pass following a failed pass and 0:0834 0:107 0:0642 0:0771
a pass following a failed rush (0:0776) (0:0790) (0:0794) (0:0808)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:338 0:362 0:348 0:394
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:0660) (0:0670) (0:0670) (0:0685)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 24:89 24:42 24:23 23:28
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table B1. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Table A5 reproduces the estimates of Table 5 for all four specications of the previous
play. Note that the (Prev 1) estimates Table A5 are identical to estimates in Table 5.
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Table A5 Di¤erence in success estimates between a...
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Rush following a rush and 0:123 0:127 0:112 0:114
a rush following a pass (0:0176) (0:0178) (0:0177) (0:0182)
Pass following a pass and 0:0274 0:0320 0:0279 0:0374
a pass following a rush (0:0131) (0:0133) (0:0133) (0:0136)
Rush following a failed rush and 0:251 0:258 0:240 0:246
a rush following a failed pass (0:0313) (0:0318) (0:0314) (0:0324)
Rush following a non-failed rush and  0:0055  0:0041  0:0169  0:0172
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:0160) (0:0162) (0:0162) (0:0165)
Pass following a failed pass and 0:0110 0:0139 0:0094 0:0203
a pass following a failed rush (0:0202) (0:0206) (0:0207) (0:0210)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:0437 0:0500 0:0465 0:0545
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:0165) (0:0167) (0:0167) (0:0171)
 2 Log L 269807:43 262498:12 260592:96 251358:09
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table B2. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Table A6 reproduces the analysis in regression (4) of Table 6 for all four specications of
the previous play. Note that the (Prev 1) regression in Table A6, is identical to regression (4)
in Table 6.
Table A6 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass on second down
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Previous pass  0:655  0:661  0:648  0:655
(0:0228) (0:0231) (0:0229) (0:0233)
Previous failure 0:204 0:205 0:226 0:194
(0:0233) (0:0239) (0:0237) (0:0245)
Previous pass * Previous failure  0:629  0:645  0:675  0:703
(0:0322) (0:0327) (0:0327) (0:0332)
 2 Log L 107882:13 105333:39 105310:64 102911:80
LR 2 12083:64 11802:50 11818:37 11642:38
Observations 86; 645 84; 574 84; 569 82; 683
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. The (Prev 1)
specication in Table A6, is identical to specication (4) in Table 6. Note that
 indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Table A7 reproduces the estimates of Table 7 for all four specications of the previous
play. Note that the (Prev 1) estimates Table A7 are identical to estimates in Table 7.
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Table A7 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained on second down between a
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Rush following a rush and 0:239 0:243 0:237 0:246
a rush following a pass (0:0857) (0:0865) (0:0870) (0:08742)
Pass following a pass and 0:452 0:459 0:443 0:441
a pass following a rush (0:0851) (0:0865) (0:0860) (0:0872)
Rush following a failed rush and 0:389 0:394 0:376 0:399
a rush following a failed pass (0:1328) (0:134) (0:136) (0:137)
Rush following a non-failed rush and 0:0886 0:0913 0:0985 0:0924
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:107) (0:108) (0:108) (0:108)
Pass following a failed pass and 0:315 0:347 0:288 0:312
a pass following a failed rush (0:108) (0:110) (0:111) (0:113)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:589 0:572 0:598 0:571
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:131) (0:133) (0:131) (0:133)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 10:38 10:19 10:18 10:07
Observations 86; 645 84; 574 84; 569 82; 683
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table B3. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Table A8 reproduces the analysis in regression (4) of Table 8 for all four specications of
the previous play. Note that the (Prev 1) regression in Table A8, is identical to regression (4)
in Table 8.
Table A8 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass on third down
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Previous pass  0:0593  0:0549  0:0529  0:0514
(0:0307) (0:0312) (0:0311) (0:0313)
Previous failure 0:144 0:139 0:142 0:130
(0:0324) (0:0332) (0:0331) (0:0334)
Previous pass * Previous failure 0:0306  0:00764 0:000378  0:0182
(0:0467) (0:0478) (0:0479) (0:0485)
 2 Log L 50204:85 48088:12 48060:55 47060:99
LR 2 6648:84 6905:33 6929:35 7033:16
Observations 54; 922 52; 815 52; 813 51; 862
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. The (Prev 1)
specication in Table A8, is identical to specication (4) in Table 8. Note that
 indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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Table A9 reproduces the estimates of Table 9 for all four specications of the previous
play. Note that the (Prev 1) estimates Table A9 are identical to estimates in Table 9.
Table A9 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained on third down between a
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Rush following a rush and  0:101  0:131  0:133  0:135
a rush following a pass (0:180) (0:182) (0:183) (0:185)
Pass following a pass and 0:0331 0:0520 0:0260 0:0464
a pass following a rush (0:0940) (0:0957) (0:0953) (0:0964)
Rush following a failed rush and  0:324  0:390  0:406  0:397
a rush following a failed pass (0:279) (0:285) (0:287) (0:290)
Rush following a non-failed rush and 0:122 0:128 0:140 0:128
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:227) (0:228) (0:227) (0:228)
Pass following a failed pass and  0:141  0:115  0:149  0:128
a pass following a failed rush (0:124) (0:127) (0:127) (0:129)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:207 0:219 0:201 0:221
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:140) (0:142) (0:141) (0:143)
R2 0:05 0:06 0:06 0:06
F-value 7:17 7:02 7:02 6:90
Observations 54; 922 52; 815 52; 813 51; 862
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table B4. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Appendix B: Summary of regressions
Table B1 presents a summary of the regressions from the estimates presented in Tables 4 and
A4 for all four denitions of the previous play
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Table B1 Regressions of yards gained
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Pass 1:715 1:729 1:738 1:724
(0:0639) (0:0646) (0:0648) (0:0662)
Previous failure 0:470 0:449 0:439 0:419
(0:0964) (0:0982) (0:0963) (0:101)
Same play type as previous 0:0368 0:0413 0:0469 0:0472
(0:0646) (0:0651) (0:0654) (0:0666)
Pass * Previous failure  0:515  0:531  0:506  0:501
(0:112) (0:114) (0:113) (0:116)
Previous failure * Same 0:202 0:186 0:164 0:201
(0:135) (0:137) (0:136) (0:140)
Pass * Same 0:301 0:321 0:301 0:347
(0:0951) (0:0962) (0:0961) (0:0982)
Pass * Previous failure * Same  0:456  0:441  0:448  0:518
(0:171) (0:173) (0:173) (0:177)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 24:89 24:42 24:23 23:28
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
We now explain how the di¤erences in Table 4 are constructed from the estimates in Table
B1. The di¤erence between a Rush following a rush and a rush following a pass and the
di¤erence between a Pass following a pass and a pass following a rush are estimated from a
model that does not control for the Previous failure variable. Therefore these di¤erences do not
obviously follow from the analysis summarized in Table B1. However, the other di¤erences
follow from the analysis summarized in Table B1. The di¤erence between a Rush following a
non-failed rush and a rush following a non-failed pass is equal to the Same play type as previous
estimate, 0:0368. The di¤erence between a Rush following a failed rush and a rush following
a failed pass is equal to the estimate for Same (0:0368) plus the estimate for the Previous
failure-Same interaction (0:202). The di¤erence between a Pass following a non-failed pass
and a pass following a non-failed rush is equal to the sum of the estimates for Same (0:0368)
and the Pass-Same interaction (0:301). The di¤erence between a Pass following a failed pass
and a pass following a failed rush is equal to the sum of the estimates for Same (0:0368), the
Pass-Same interaction (0:301), the Pass-Previous failure-Same interaction ( 0:456), and the
Previous failure-Same interaction (0:202).
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Table B2 presents a summary of the regressions from the estimates presented in Tables 5
and A5 for all four denitions of the previous play
Table B2 Logistic regressions of a successful play
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Pass 0:0149 0:0097 0:0043  0:0032
(0:0159) (0:0161) (0:0162) (0:0165)
Previous failure  0:291  0:294  0:281  0:267
(0:0254) (0:0260) (0:0254) (0:0267)
Same play type as previous  0:0055  0:0041  0:0169  0:0172
(0:0160) (0:0162) (0:0162) (0:0165)
Pass * Previous failure 0:373 0:376 0:378 0:389
(0:0293) (0:0297) (0:0295) (0:0303)
Previous failure * Same 0:256 0:262 0:257 0:263
(0:0352) (0:0357) (0:0354) (0:0364)
Pass * Same 0:0492 0:0541 0:0634 0:0717
(0:0237) (0:0240) (0:0240) (0:0245)
Pass * Previous failure * Same  0:289  0:299  0:294  0:297
(0:0442) (0:0449) (0:0446) (0:0458)
 2 Log L 269807:43 262498:12 260592:96 251358:09
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects.. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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Table B3 presents a summary of the regressions from the estimates presented in Tables 7
and A7 for all four denitions of the previous play
Table B3 Regressions of yards gained on second down
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Pass 1:671 1:686 1:680 1:686
(0:108) (0:109) (0:108) (0:109)
Previous failure 0:209 0:205 0:207 0:200
(0:131) (0:134) (0:132) (0:136)
Same play type as previous 0:0886 0:0913 0:0985 0:0924
(0:107) (0:108) (0:108) (0:108)
Pass * Previous failure  0:200  0:225  0:204  0:210
(0:1500) (0:152) (0:152) (0:153)
Previous failure * Same 0:301 0:302 0:278 0:306
(0:170) (0:172) (0:173) (0:174)
Pass * Same 0:501 0:480 0:499 0:478
(0:171) (0:173) (0:171) (0:173)
Pass * Previous failure * Same  0:575  0:527  0:587  0:565
(0:242) (0:245) (0:245) (0:248)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 10:38 10:19 10:18 10:07
Observations 86; 645 84; 574 84; 569 82; 683
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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Table B4 presents a summary of the regressions from the estimates presented in Tables 9
and A9 for all four denitions of the previous play
Table B4 Regressions of yards gained on third down
(Prev 1) (Prev 2) (Prev 3) (Prev 4)
Pass 1:050 1:097 1:107 1:092
(0:201) (0:203) (0:202) (0:203)
Previous failure 1:348 1:359 1:382 1:376
(0:269) (0:273) (0:274) (0:277)
Same play type as previous 0:122 0:128 0:140 0:127
(0:227) (0:228) (0:227) (0:228)
Pass * Previous failure  1:208  1:286  1:297  1:287
(0:295) (0:299) (0:301) (0:304)
Previous failure * Same  0:446  0:517  0:546  0:525
(0:359) (0:364) (0:365) (0:369)
Pass * Same 0:0852 0:0912 0:0609 0:0938
(0:267) (0:269) (0:268) (0:270)
Pass * Previous failure * Same 0:0975 0:184 0:196 0:175
(0:407) (0:414) (0:414) (0:418)
R2 0:05 0:06 0:06 0:06
F-value 7:17 7:02 7:02 6:90
Observations 54; 922 52; 815 52; 813 51; 862
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Appendix C: Alternate specication of success
Here we perform the estimates as conducted in Table 5, however, we use a di¤erent measure
of success. This alternate measure of success uses the same criteria for rst, third, and fourth
downs as the original measure. However, in order for the play to be a considered success on
second down, 70% of the distance, rather than 60%, must be gained.
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Table C1 Di¤erence in alternate success estimates between a...
Rush following a rush and a rush following a pass 0:107
(0:0181)
Pass following a pass and a pass following a rush 0:00583
(0:0132)
Rush following a failed rush and a rush following a failed pass 0:248
(0:0325)
Rush following a non-failed rush and a rush following a non-failed pass  0:0328
(0:0160)
Pass following a failed pass and a pass following a failed rush  0:0006
(0:0205)
Pass following a non-failed pass and a pass following a non-failed rush 0:0122
(0:0164)
 2 Log L 267339:89
These estimates are based on 209; 963 observations. Based on the Wald test
of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at
p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
In both Table 5 and Table C1, we see that a rush following a rush is signicantly more
likely to be successful than a rush following a pass. We also see that a rush following a failed
rush is signicantly more likely to be successful than a rush following a failed pass. However,
we note that there are di¤erences between the estimates presented in Table 5 and those in
Table C1. We see that the negative e¤ects of the serial correlation are less severe for pass
plays. We also see that there is a negative signicant estimate for the di¤erence between a
rush followed by a non-failed rush and a rush followed by a non-failed pass play.
Appendix D: Team-specic serial correlation
We now investigate the team-specic aspects of the serial correlation in play calling. We
conduct the analysis of regression (3) in Table 3 restricted to each of the 414 team-seasons
in our data set. For every team-season we note the estimate of the Previous pass coe¢ cient.
We then compare these estimates to other characteristics of the teams. Perhaps teams that
are more successful exhibit less serial correlation? We therefore compare the estimates to the
number of regular season wins during that season.32 The Wins variable has a minimum of 0
and a maximum of 16. It is also possible that head coaching positions that are less stable are
more likely to exhibit serial correlation. We therefore compare the estimates to the number
of head coaches employed by that particular team during our sample period. This Coaches
variable ranges from 1 (Philadelphia Eagles) to 8 (Oakland Raiders). Finally, it is possible
that the longer a head coach is employed, the less pressure there will be to appear to be
"unpredictable." Therefore we dene the Tenure length variable, which measures the length
of the head coachs tenure. If there was a mid-season change in the head coach then Tenure
length is 0. If a rst-year head coach begins and ends the season as head coach, the Tenure
32There were three ties in our sample period. In the event of a tie, both teams were awarded 0:5 wins.
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length is 1. If the head coach was not replaced before the end of the second year, the Tenure
length is 2. This continues until either the end of the sample period or the replacement of the
head coach. In Table D1 we run regressions with the team-season Previous pass estimates as
the dependent variable and the independent variables mentioned above.
Table D1 Previous pass coe¢ cient estimate by team-season
(1) (2) (3)
Wins  0:00176    
(0:00642)
Coaches   0:00140  
(0:0104)
Tenure length      0:00226
(0:00604)
R2 0:00018 0:000044 0:00034
Each regression has 414 observations. Note that  indicates signicance at
p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at
p < 0:001.
We do not nd a relationship between the serial correlation estimates and either the team
or team-season characteristics. Below, in Figure D1, we show the scatterplot for the number
of average wins for a team and the average of the Previous pass estimates for the team.
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Figure D1
36
